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The reach and scale of Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) are 
expanding to many aspects of our everyday lives. Health, safety, 
transportation and education are a few areas where CPS are 
increasingly prevalent. There is a pressing need to secure CPS, 
both at the edge and at the network core. We present a hybrid 
framework for securing CPS that leverages the computational 
resources and coordination of Fog networks, and builds on cellular 
connectivity for low-power and resource constrained CPS devices. 
The routine support for cellular authentication, encryption, and 
integrity protection is enhanced with the addition of a cellular 
cloud controller to take over the management of the radio and core 
security contexts dedicated to CPS devices. Specialized cellular 
cloudlets liaison with core network components to implement 
localized and network-wide defense for denial-or-service, smart 
jamming, or unauthorized CPS tracking attacks. A comparison 
between our framework  and recent cellular/fog solutions is 
provided, together with a feasibility analysis for operational 
framework deployment. We conclude with future research 
directions that we believe are pivotal to the proliferation of secure 
and scalable CPS.   
Keywords— Cyber-Physical Systems Security; Cellular IoT; 
LTE-V2V; Fog Computing; Cloudlets; Hybrid architecture  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are smart systems that 
include engineered networks of interacting physical and 
computational components [1]. Each CPS manifestation has 
unique operational requirements depending on the application 
it supports. For example, smart grids require a nationwide 
network of meters for fast delivery of the metered information. 
Systems for control of industrial processes require myriad 
sensors for pressure, temperature, and motion to prevent system 
outages and environmental hazard. Smart healthcare 
applications require patient-worn monitors for vital signs and 
changes in patient conditions for diagnosis in real-time. Smart 
cars must retrieve sensor information including speed, weather 
conditions, sense nearby pedestrians and communicate in real-
time to prevent collisions and improve traffic flow.  
CPS has evolved to encompass sensors, actuators, varying 
modalities of network infrastructures, as well as an increasing 
spectrum of interactions with humans. These technologies are 
different from those in a traditional computational setting; the 
clients in CPS are sensors or actuators with restricted 
computational resources and are often battery-powered. The 
servers not only support web traffic in non-real-time, but handle 
real-time and mission-critical applications like monitoring of 
power distribution over large regions. Even CPS traffic cannot 
be simply met with wired/wireless TCP/IP access. CPS 
applications communicate over various wireless technologies 
and use different protocols to share the sensory and actuation 
data.   
CPS technologies demand practical security approaches to 
ensure consistent protection of the entire cyber-physical 
ecosystem.  Sensors and actuators are often battery powered, 
with modest resources that preclude implementing 
computationally intensive security algorithms. While 
traditional protection modes may work for securing the 
computing components and communication technologies, 
many problems arise with scalability and the cyber-physical 
dynamics. Smart grids or environmental monitoring systems 
contain large amounts of physical components that scale fast, 
routinely distributed authentication or automatic patching 
difficult to implement. A static CPS topology cannot be 
assumed for smart cars or smart healthcare applications as they 
require support for mobility and varying number of devices 
with unique communication patterns.  
To meet these demands, we propose a security framework 
that builds on advancements in cellular networks and fog 
computing, tailored to support secure CPS operation. Cellular 
networks provide nationwide coverage, mobility management, 
and built-in encryption, authentication, and integrity protection 
of user communication. Recently, the LTE infrastructure has 
been upgraded to support CPS access for computationally 
restricted devices and smart vehicles [2]. In parallel, fog 
computing gains traction as an efficient platform supporting 
customized and near-edge computation that could support real-
time security computations. Fog nodes coordinate among 
themselves to offload processing from less capable or 
overburdened elements, eliminate application bottlenecks, 
attest the trustworthiness of devices, and facilitate self-
reconfiguration for continuous security protection [3]. 
Leveraging cellular access with fog computing allows for 
feasible security implementations in most cyber-physical 
applications. 
In the remainder of this paper, we elaborate on the design 
requirements and challenges of CPS, leading to security 
vulnerabilities. We present a detailed discussion on these 
security challenges in Section III, and elaborate on the cellular 
networks security in Section IV, emphasizing the new 
advancements in the LTE infrastructure. The potential of 
leveraging Fog computing to improve near-edge security is 
elaborated upon in Section V. We present our framework for 
CPS security over a hybrid Cellular-Fog architecture in Section 
VI, and discuss the premise and feasibility of this framework in 
section VII. We conclude in Section VIII with future insights 
on how CPS security could be addressed more thoroughly and 
holistically via this framework, and building on advancements 
in tangent Edge technologies.    
II. CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS  
The CPS conceptual model is shown in Fig 1. The sensors 
provide information about the physical state in the cyber 
domain, which is computationally processed to render an 
actionable output. The actuators translate this output to alter or 
modify the physical state. There are six main CPS domains: (1) 
Smart Grids, (2) Industrial Control Systems (ICS), (3) 
Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS), (4) Smart Healthcare, (5) 
Smart Environments, and (6) Smart homes [4].  
Smart grids are the early CPS where the computing 
components support remote power metering, maintenance, and 
power distribution control. Smart grids require massive, 
nationwide deployment of sensors and actuators that must 
communicate with minimum delay and latency. Domain 
specific protocols are used together with wireless access 
technologies like IEEE 802.11 b/g/n/ac, ZigBee or Cellular IoT 
(CIoT) for reliable and scalable communication [5].  
ICS use the sensed information about light intensity, 
humidity, pressure, or temperature to implement production 
logic through actuators known as Programmable Logic 
Controllers (PLCs). The computing components in ICS 
supervise and control manufacturing processes or render 
emergency/safety decisions to halt operations. The operation in 
ICS does not necessarily require many sensors/actuators or 
large throughput but requires minimum delay and latency for 
communication. Like smart grids, ICS use similar domain 
specific protocols and increasingly rely on wireless access to 
optimize installation and maintenance costs [5], [6].    
ITS are another popular cyber physical domain where on-
board computers or traffic management systems sense road 
conditions to avoid collisions, optimize routes, or congestion 
control. ITS require wireless transmission for both the 
Vehicular-to-Vehicular (V2V) or Vehicular-to-Infrastructure 
(V2I) communications and have strict requirements for 
minimum delay and latency. To meet these requirements, IEEE 
provides a complete V2V/V2I suite for communication with the 
IEEE 1609 Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) 
protocol group. LTE also offers V2V/V2I communication 
alternative from Release 14 onwards, supporting national scale 
deployments and massive capacity on a nationwide level [7].   
Smart healthcare is enhancement in diagnosis, treatment 
and monitoring of patients based on real-time information from 
patients’ vital signs. This information helps doctors and nurses 
to determine the optimal drug dosage or adjust other treatments 
to patients, even remotely. Most smart healthcare applications 
use short range wireless technologies like 6LoWPAN, BLE, or 
ZigBee to communicate with a telemedicine cloud. However, 
the CIoT enable long range coverage with mobility support, so 
sensors like wearables for active people are also included for 
real-time mobile patient monitoring [8].  
Smart environments use cyber-physical interactions to 
better understand the operating conditions in spaces, buildings, 
or cities and assist the occupants in executing their tasks. 
Because the sensing is static in nature, sensors in smart 
environments require extended battery life and relaxed 
delay/latency budget. Wireless access is preferred for simplicity 
and scalability, therefore applications like ambient intelligence 
have the option to implement LoRaWAN or CIoT technologies 
that support wide area operation [9], [10]. The advantage of 
CIoT is that the low power communication is supported for 
longer ranges and regional access. The similar idea for cyber-
physical assistance drives the development of smart homes, 
although on a much smaller scale. Smart home sensors and 
actuators like ambient lights, smart switches, smart thermostats 
and smoke/water/gas leak detectors communicate on the local 
network or over BLE/ZigBee and are controlled by the home 
occupants [11].  
III. SECURITY DEMANDS OF CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS  
CPS operate in more vulnerable conditions compared to 
traditional computing systems. An adversary can alter the 
physical state, induce inaccurate sensory observations, or 
modify the actuation to disturb normal CPS operation. For 
example, it is possible for an adversary to interfere with an 
artificial glucose monitoring system to ignore a patient’s 
glucose-level readings and alter insulin injection levels [12]. 
Adversaries can target mission-critical CPS to cause maximum 
damage. In the only confirmed case of hacker-caused blackouts 
in history, adversaries were able to take control of a Windows 
XP machine running the control server in the Ukrainian electric 
utility company Ukrenergo, and turn off the power distribution 
without causing any alarms [13].  
 Achieving secure CPS operation also helps satisfy the safety 
and business continuity requirements of these systems. 
Therefore, a thorough CPS security implementation demands: 
(1) lightweight security processing, (2) frequent changes in 
system capacity, (3) non-patched devices, (4) system-level 
security visibility, and (5) minimum-impact incident response.  
Supporting lightweight processing means that the security 
baseline (authentication, encryption, integrity protection) must 
 
 
Fig. 1. CPS Conceptual Model 
 
be met with minimum processing power, minimum energy, and 
possibly in non-real time [14]. Most sensors and actuators are 
computationally restricted to perform complex calculation or 
maintain encrypted connections in real-time. However, this 
should not let CPS systems default to no encryption or only 
simple one-way authentication.    
Frequent changes in system capacity require the security 
management to scale with the dynamic CPS topology and 
sporadic traffic. Smart cars randomly come and go at a 
monitored intersection, for example, and advanced meters 
communicate measurement reports by sending only one IP 
packet on 30-minute intervals. The detection of suspicious 
system behavior will differ between enterprise networks and 
CPS networks, so reusing existing intrusion detection and 
protection setups seems impractical.  
Intrusion detection and protection goes hand in hand with a 
regular patch management program. However, patching CPS 
devices is not straightforward as it is for computing 
components. Sensors and actuators are designed to work over 
very long lifespans with minimal interruption and on-site 
human intervention. A firmware upgrade of glucose monitors 
distributed to many patients or on-board car systems in already 
sold cars is hard to complete. Even if it is, by the time the all 
affected CPS devices are patched, new firmware upgrade may 
be needed due to newly discovered vulnerabilities.  
The presence of knowingly vulnerable CPS devices in a 
dynamic network topology requires a security visibility beyond 
simple collection of status reports or log data [15]. 
Knowledgeable adversaries will interfere to preclude the 
delivery of insulin or send falsified data to nearby cars to create 
congestion or traffic disasters. Also, adversaries might try to 
interfere with sensors’ observations and simply increase the 
temperature near a thermometer or induce vibrations near a 
vibration sensors. Therefore, a CPS security implementation 
needs not only to look after the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability; it must also ensure the veracity of sensors’ 
observations and maintain a plausible system state at any time 
(one that does not deviate to far from values estimated by some 
model) [16].  
Mission-critical CPS have strict requirements for high 
availability. This restricts the patching frequency of the control 
systems and limits the timeframe for incident response. When 
an incident is detected in purely cyber system, the compromised 
parts are either isolated or taken offline to reinstall, reboot or 
update the running software and/or hardware. These actions 
almost always take more than few minutes. In parallel, a copy 
of the running services from the affected parts is brought up to 
serve during the overall system restore. These strategies 
adopted for enterprise incident response will not work for most 
CPS; they can neither tolerate taking system parts offline for 
more than several minutes, nor easily bring replicas of the 
affected system elements (e.g. PLCs or smart meters) to take 
over the operation while the incident response is in progress.       
IV. CELLULAR NETWORKS SUPPORT FOR CPS SECURITY 
CPS security demands are hard to meet with a single 
protection system or traditional enterprise protection practices. 
Significant customization of existing security solutions might 
be an option, but its costly and there are not guaranteed to work 
in all CPS domains. Recent advancements in 3GPP Rel. 13 
enable CPS wireless access, with the inherently authenticated 
and regulated communication infrastructure of cellular network 
systems [17]. That is, CPS devices connected to a cellular 
network will benefit from LTE-grade security while having the 
advantages of wide area coverage, high density, support for 
mobility, minimum delay and latency, and high throughput. In 
this section we highlight the advantages of cellular connectivity 
that afford feasible security for CPS.  
A. Cellular CPS Access   
Cellular networks support CPS specific access under the 
Cellular IoT (CIoT) umbrella. CIoT offers three different 
options for system level connectivity: Extended Coverage GSM 
IoT (EC-GSM-IoT), enhanced Machine Type Communication 
(eMTC), and Narrowband IoT (NB-IoT) [2]. In addition, 
cellular networks support LTE-V2V access designed 
specifically for ITS applications [18]. 
EC-GSM-IoT extends the network capacity, adds LTE-
grade security, and improves the power efficiency both for 
legacy GSM-based CPS applications and new low-cost CPS 
applications in areas with no LTE coverage. GSM has the 
largest global coverage footprint and very small time-to-market, 
which is a significant advantage for CPS applications like smart 
environments, homes, or healthcare. Under these 
improvements, EC-GSM-IoT provides a combined capacity of 
up to 50,000 CPS devices per cell sector [2].   
eMTC is an adaptation of the current LTE access to 
accommodate a wide range of CPS. It enables a 15 dB 
enhancement over the standard LTE coverage,  supports relaxed 
latency, bigger delay budget and device mobility. eMTC is fully 
compatible with the standard LTE, making it relatively easier to 
support in deployed LTE networks. 3GPP introduces a  self-
contained NB-IoT radio access for CPS requiring modest data 
rates, longer battery life, extended coverage and massive 
capacity. The narrower bandwidth of only 200 kHz allows for 
significant reduction in device complexity, supporting sporadic 
(maximum latency of 10 seconds) and low-rate CPS traffic (50 
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kbps) for a long battery life (five to ten years). As for capacity, 
NB-IoT supports up to 52,547 CPS devices per cell sector [19]. 
3GPP also enables LTE-V2V access supporting high speed 
(up to 250 km/h), high density (thousands of connected 
vehicles), and less than 100 milliseconds latency CPS traffic, 
suitable for ITS applications. LTE-V2V currently enables 
deployment of two configurations: ad-hoc transmission 
scheduling between the vehicles, and eNB assisted scheduling. 
In both deployments, vehicles utilize the standard LTE features 
for mobility, security, and session management.  
B. Cellular CPS Infrastructure 
 To support CPS operation, 3GPP dedicates a separate core 
element, the Cellular IoT Serving Gateway Node (C-SGN) 
shown in Fig. 2 [20]. C-GSN manages the IP traffic delivery to 
and from the Application server and together with the HSS 
ensures scalable authentication, key management and network 
level encryption for resource constrained CPS devices. This 
adaptation enables easier scaling using existing, nationwide 
LTE infrastructures, seamless support for LTE-V2V, and CPS-
specific traffic models including non-IP traffic (e.g. SMS).   
C. Cellular CPS Security  
From a security perspective, the built-in LTE security is of 
great advantage for CPS. The LTE security architecture shown 
in Fig 3 is based on a pre-shared cryptographic key K stored in 
a tamper-resistant SIM card on the device side and in the HSS 
on the network side [21]. This key is used in a Authentication 
and Key Agreement (AKA) security protocol that distinguishes 
Access Stratum (AS) security in the radio part and Non-Access 
Stratum (NAS) in the core part of the network. For the radio 
part, the CPS device and the eNB maintain an AS security 
context that includes the cryptographic keys at AS level, next 
hop parameters, cryptographic algorithms used for enciphering 
and integrity protection, and counters used for replay attacks 
protection. CPS devices and the C-SGN maintain a NAS 
security context too, with the similar parameters including the 
NAS level keys as depicted in Fig 3.  
Every time a CPS device registers with the network, sends 
or receives data, or moves under coverage of another eNB the 
AKA is invoked and both the AS and NAS security context are 
established with the network. The security signalization for 
CPS with infrequent and small data transmissions leads to 
inefficient use of the radio resources and battery power. For 
example, periodic metering reports in smart grids take 20-200 
kB and are sent on 30 minutes or longer intervals. To optimize 
the security signalization, the C-SGN and the CPS devices can 
store the AS security context and reuse it when they perform 
service request to send metering or command data [17].  
Another optimization is a data transfer (single IP packet in 
one direction) over NAS signaling with a pre-established NAS 
security context. In this case, CPS devices are not required to 
establish an AS security context. Instead, the NAS-encrypted IP 
packet is send as a message in the signalization transaction for 
radio resource connection setup together with an updated 
counter and decrypted by the C-SGN using the other elements 
in the pre-established NAS security context. 
Cellular networks implement performance management for 
routine network operation and maintenance that can also be of 
advantage for CPS security monitoring. Assuming operation 
with non-patched or malicious devices, the network 
performance management is useful for system-level security 
visibility and detection of malicious CPS behavior [22]. 
Examples like the Mirai IoT botnet confirm that smart home 
CPS devices can be orchestrated to launch distributed Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attacks even outside of the these domains and 
harm regular Internet hosts [23]. Analyzing the performance 
indicators for traffic and signalization utilization per cell, per 
CPS device, or a CPS domain can alter for potential DoS and 
minimize the time for incident response.   
V. FOG COMPUTING SUPPORT FOR CPS SECURITY 
There is a significant push to leverage Edge resources in 
advancing network and computing functionalities. One of the 
prime areas of growth lies in Fog Computing. This domain has 
been introduced as a mediation layer between remote Cloud 
services, and local computing/networked devices [24]. The 
notion of cyber foraging for improving local operation via 
remote resources has evolved over multiple manifestations of 
Cloud/Fog/Mist architectures [25]. Overall, each instance of 
Cloud resources, at every level, needs to be matched with 
functional requests given pre-determined latency and capacity 
constraints. The resulting offloading problem is application 
specific and raises significant challenges in both scalability and 
response times. A more detailed analysis of the tiers/classes of 
Cloud/Fog/Mist architectures is presented in [26]. 
To secure CPS interactions at the Edge, we propose 
leveraging the Fog infrastructure in multiple fronts, including 
offloading processing/authentication, trustworthy security 
attestation, and minimum-downtime protection  [3]. That is, we 
argue that CPS systems can optimize their computational 
resources to support complex security monitoring and policy 
enforcement [27] by leveraging fog resources. In this section 
we highlight the advantages of fog computing that afford 
feasible security for CPS. 
A. Computational offloading for CPS devices 
Fog resources could significantly aid the operation of CPS 
devices. This includes the management of AS and NAS security 
contexts on the network-core side for CPS devices. Fog services 
can maintain validity timers (how long before a new context 
needs to be generated), reuse counters (how many times a CPS 
device has reused a context), the average number of 
authenticated users per CPS domain to offload C-GSN and 
eNBs, in addition to optimizing the security signalization. 
Another function suitable for fog nodes is local security data 
sharing for preliminary defense. Fog nodes interact with a 
subset of eNBs and can correlate the plausibility state with 
traffic load information from the C-SGN to raise alarms for 
potential DDoS attacks.  
B. Trustworthy Security Attestation 
Fog nodes can act as attesters of security trustworthiness for 
CPS devices. In deployments with a large number of devices, 
this is useful because it enables granular detection of abnormal 
behavior, which cannot be detected with only a general network 
monitoring.  For example, changes in V2V traffic load in a 
subset of eNBs covering a segment of a highway intersection 
that is not a result of a congestion might alarm for a 
compromised smart car. Attestation can also happen for a 
subset of CPS devices to look for falsified measurement reports 
or unauthorized commands from a remote CPS application.   
C. Minimum Downtime Protection 
To improve on CPS self-defense capabilities, we propose 
leveraging Fog-based attestation functions. In many CPS 
deployments, a compromised device may still be allowed to 
operate, because taking it down will disturb the physical state 
of the system. For example, a compromised PLC in a water 
plant – controlling chlorine levels – will prompt isolation for 
other PLCs controlling water distribution, when detected by the 
fog attestation. Fog nodes will also attest CPS control servers 
to check for potential compromises on an application level, and 
provide a system-level report so ICS operators can take actions 
for manual chlorine control and removal of potential 
application malware.  
VI. A HYBRID FOG-CELLULAR NETWORK FOR CPS SECURITY 
To meet the security demands discussed in Section III, we 
propose a hybrid CPS security architecture, shown in Fig 4.  
The objective is to enhance CPS security by leveraging fog 
computing and cellular access. The cellular infrastructure is 
well poised to support connectivity for a wide range of CPS 
devices, and the fog architecture can significantly aid response 
time and more complex security tasks, especially for CPS 
devices that are spatially correlated.  
The proposed hybrid architecture supports lightweight 
security processing with recent adaptations for optimized use of 
AS and NAS security contexts for CPS access. The 
authentication, encryption, and integrity protection are handled 
by cellular nodes, but a cellular cloud controller node is 
introduced to offload the management of the AS/NAS security 
contexts. Thus, the CPS AS can dedicate its resources to only 
execute application logic, and periodically check with the 
cellular cloud controller on the CPS devices’ security status.  
Fog resources will be delegated to specialized Cloudlets, 
which are the anchoring Fog access points in this edge 
technology [24] [26]. These devices are either designed and 
deployed near each group of CPS devices, or could be virtually 
realized by delegating its tasks to a more capable (high-end) 
CPS device. Each Cloudlet will be tasked with broadcasting its 
service set to neighboring CPS devices for task-offloading, 
spanning both computational and security-related 
functionalities. Cloudlets will liaison with cellular network-
core components, to support region-wide and network wide 
defense functionalities, including protection from DDoS and 
tracking malicious users/devices that operate across CPS 
deployments. Their overall task would be to carry out 
local/Edge processing and security functionalities, as well as 
delivering a rapidly-accessible infrastructure for coordinating 
between CPS deployments and core security functions on the 
cellular backbone. Each cloudlet will be directly connected via 
high-speed and authenticate access to a cellular BS, and will be 
designed to adapt to different cellular-based Internet backbones 
(i.e. communication modalities and standards).  
 
 
Fig. 4. Proposed hybrid CPS security architecture. 
 
On the network core, the cellular cloud controller also 
offloads the processing burden from the C-SGN, those resulting 
from the frequent changes in CPS system capacity. A cellular 
network can support many CPS applications from different 
domains requiring either AS context storage, pre-established 
NAS security context, or both. Instead of having the C-SGN 
maintain the security requirements for each CPS application, 
that cellular cloud controller could perform this in coordination 
with the CPS application server. C-GSN and eNBs will be 
probed to generate the contexts, and revoke and/or regenerate 
them, but the IDS/IPS monitoring logic will be a responsibility 
of the cellular cloud controller. 
This segregation of security duties enables system-level 
security visibility and helps operate with non-patched or 
compromised CPS devices. Managing the security contexts and 
the CPS device/application security attestation enables the 
cellular cloud controller to maintain a plausible system state at 
any time, in coordination with spatially-aware Cloudlets. The 
plausible state for mission-critical CPS assumes high 
availability so any threat of downtime can be detected as early 
as possible, helping operators to respond to incidents with 
minimum impact on the CPS operation.  
VII. FEASIBILITY DISCUSSION 
The goal for blending fog computing and cellular access for 
CPS is to meet the specific security demands with minimal 
adaptations on CPS side. Shifting the security burden on the 
infrastructure side is practical and cost effective. The CIoT and 
LTE-V2V access are readily available as software upgrades in 
already existing LTE networks. Given that C-SGN incorporates 
most of the standard LTE functionalities for session, mobility 
and security management, it can be implemented as network 
upgrade in the Evolved Packet Core (EPC). The cellular cloud 
controller assumes most of the costs, but the overall architecture 
is less expensive compared with, for example, the costs needed 
to build a nation-wide DSRC infrastructure for ITS support 
(which can serve only one CPS domain). 
Fog computing as a concept is explored as an enhancement 
for the cellular radio access to support local caching and 
optimized radio resource management [28]. Our architecture 
can be well integrated in a Fog Radio Access Network (F-RAN) 
where the management of the AS and NAS security contexts 
can be a part of the local caching. We designated a standalone 
fog computing node to allow separate implementation and full 
security support in cases where a F-RAN is not viable option. 
The cellular cloud controller can be also integrated into a 
Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) infrastructure. MEC as a 
technology has already been proposed in integration with LTE-
V2V for ITS applications and standard LTE access for smart 
healthcare and smart home applications [29]. With a MEC 
integration in 5G deployments, our hybrid architecture can 
support security not just for CPS, but also for use cases like 
augmented reality.  
Blending technologies requires an interdisciplinary 
approach, but also requires a feasibility analysis from an 
infrastructural security point of view, even in case where the 
purpose of blending is to provide security support. Authors in 
[30] agree with this proposition and provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the security threats and issues for fog-related 
technologies including F-RAN and MEC. The threats are 
classified per assets included in each fog technology: network 
infrastructure, edge data center, core infrastructure, 
virtualization infrastructure, and user devices. Our proposed 
solution incorporates all of these assets, so the fog threat model 
equally applies to it. The threats of DoS is relevant in our case 
given the possibility for rogue cars in an ITS scenario or sensors 
in smart entrainments/homes to target the availability of the 
eNBs or the cellular cloud controller, respectively. For 
example, CPS devices can misuse the small data transfer to 
initiate signaling storm targeting the C-SGN and the cellular 
cloud controller. The proposed architecture assumes trusted 
network operations, however, misuse of network functions have 
occurred in the pass from rogue insiders, making the threat for 
insider service manipulation also relevant in our case [31]. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The exponential growth of CPS and IoT systems are mandating 
the design and integration of novel architectures. Securing their 
operation, interactions, data sustenance and access policies is 
the area of immanent research interest. In this work we 
elaborated on two foundational technologies that have 
witnessed significant leaps in agility and functional expansion, 
and are now poised to significantly aid our ongoing pursuit to 
securing CPS. Rapid developments in edge computing, 
facilitated via Cloudlets and Fog Access Points, have 
significantly empowered deployed CPS devices in taking on 
more complex and time-sensitive functionalities, that were 
previously infeasible given their constrained resources. We 
surveyed recent developments in Fog networking, and how a 
number of functionalities could be supported by Cloudlets/ Fog 
APs to improve CPS operation and security. Recent 
developments in Cellular IoT are promising significant 
authentication and provisioning capabilities to low-power CPS, 
and have recently gained momentum in providing near-edge 
services with considerably less overhead on these devices.  
We presented a hybrid architecture that aids security and 
provisioning in CPS systems, leveraging recent advances in Fog 
networking and cellular IoT. The hybrid architecture is 
articulated on Cloudlet access at every edge network, and 
details a set of primary functionalities that could be delivered to 
CPS systems without impacting design and deployment 
schemes. This hybrid architecture has been designed with 
integration and cross-validation at its heart, whereby CPS 
system are monitored and managed via implicit back-end 
collaboration, sustained via Cloud and Fog services that 
interconnect and analyze traffic and access policies via the 
cellular backbone. 
In future work, we plan to implement this hybrid architecture in 
health-focused CPS. Specifically, we are currently developing 
a secure framework for developing an Internet of Medical 
Things, targeting secure interactions between medical devices, 
physicians, patients, and other stakeholders in the medical 
domain.  
It is important to note that the growing abundance of connected 
devices in the CPS ecosystem, is quickly drowning our security 
and provisioning mechanisms. This is magnified by 
developments in isolated silos, and a recent trend to delegate 
AP specific security mechanisms that do not take into account 
coordinated attacks and malicious interventions with network 
operations. We identified physical plant management and 
medical CPS as two vulnerable sectors, and they require the 
aggregated development of security, access provisioning and 
proactive traffic monitoring protocols, to ensure safe 
interactions with humans and environments.  
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